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Introduction
A low level of income 'ead' t '
food, cloths and sheller is the fact nf~ a lOa~eq,uate access to
households in Nepal Th's t r a maJOrJty of farming
• I S ate of people's (f "
case) poverty is generally intar r' armer s 10 our
to adoPt new agrarian technol~ ete~ ~n terms of their ignorance
chemical fertilizers impro d gy such as farm mechanics.
• • ve seeds and the I'k
IOcrease in agriCUltural prod r I e - - for an
well'being. This . uc ran to enhance their economic
Importance on t h I
growth cannot be denied B h ee no ogy for production
. . ut t e blame On P I Itheir poverty ignores the eft t f eop e a one for
. ec a structural arrangemenls,
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As Ellioll (1975) observes. poverty of people in thO
'hlrd World countries Is a result of the structural process
arranged for the enrichment of the elites The elites. by virtue
of their political and economic power. gear most of the resource
of society towards their own benefit. However. to avoid the
risk of possible question about legitimacy of such an askewed
distribution, they regulate distributive channels in forms of new
development interventions or reform measures to provide an
image of competitive success for enrichment. but maintaining
a selective biase in competition. Through this strategy, they
neutralize revolutionary forces of society and increase their own
confidence to rule. This is what Elliott calls the "confidence
mechanism" of the elites to keep continuity of their interest in
society.
But sometimes the confidence mechanism fails. The
revolution terminating Panchayat rule in favour of multi-party
system of government in Nepal, with new group of elites in
formal power structure, can be taken es an example. This event
raises three issues for an academic discussion: i) through what
confidence mechanism had the Panchayat political elites ruled
over the country amidst poverty of the peasants? Why did
that confidence mechanism fail to get legitimacy of public support
resulting to a change of the system through revolution? What
challenge will the n",w group of elites have to face to fulfill the
promise of revolution? This paper attempts to delve on these
issues. Before this needs however, one clarification.
The 49 days long revolution (from Feb. J 8, 1990 to
April 9, 1990) headed by Nepali Congress with support of the
United Left Front and backed by professionals, students and
peasants forced the king to dismiss Panchayat rule in April 9,
1990. These verious groups involved in the movement might
have their own particular interests for such an involvement.
They all were however, common to charge the previous system
to hava plunged the country into socia-economic damage
creating haldships in the survival of the people. In a country
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with above 90 percent of the population emsnatitlg agrarian
livelihoods, the landless, marginal and small farm households
accounting about 78 percent (NPC 1983; 3, 7) of the total farm
population must be the ones to be highly affected from the
systemic defects. It is also the support of this population to
give legitimacy of the movement. The focus of this paper will
be therefore, on examining the policies and programmes
affecting farming systems in the country. Where the first
section presents the anatomy of those policies and their effects,
the second section will identify their structural roots. The third
section noras some ch2:lIenges ahead to fulfill the promise of
revolution. Secondary materials are the basic sources of
information,
Anatomy of Farm Related Policies
and Their Effects
Discussions on policies and programmes effecting a
system of farming require to define the concept "farming
system" itself at the beginning. Farming system denotes to
that total process in which a farm household with a set of
inputs for agricultural production works to produce and use
that product within a social selting. Farm inputs can be of three
categories - - natura!. technological and institutional. Natural
inputs are the land, water and forest resources used for the
purpose 01 production. Technological inputs include the types
of farm tools. human skills, seeds, nutriants and power used for
that purpose Institutional inputs are the conditions of market.
credit facilities and related policies which affect the use and
distribution of inPuts. labour and products. These input
elements are set into motion through such activities: preparation
of farm fields, planting of seeds, irrigating. weeding. protecting
the crops and maintaining tools. implements SOurces of power
such as animals, machines and the like. The final product needs
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then to ~e hslvesled, stoied, proMssed, traltSPOIMd and
consumed or marketed to complete one farming sYStem cycle.
This wider coverage of farming system components
suggests therefore, the same for policies affecting them. For the
purpose of simplicity, those policies and prograll1mes can be
classified into two broader categories in terms of the nature of
their effects. One category includes those whir.h affect the
productive base of farming households. ProgramIlles related to
land reform, resettlement, institutional credit anU marketing,
forest managAment, etc. fall under this category. Another
category. of policies I programmes operate thro~gh affecting
farmers' needs and obligations. 'Those related to populatioll
change, health and education, market extention etc. can be
taken in this type.
While the operation of the second categOry of policies
and programmes determine the extent of pressure ~pon farmers'
resources and opportunities, that of the first category of
programmes determine the extent to which those lesources and
opportunities are preserved and promoted. Given the pressure
upon those resources and opportunities, the degree of positive
contribution from the first category of policies and programmes
conditions the quality of living of the farmers. Therefore, this
section firstly describes the first group of policies and
programmes under Panehayat ruie with few notes about their
background situation. Then, it dwells On the effect Of the second
category of programmes on the basis of which Will be judged
against the achievements of thosa of the first to observe the
conditions of the peasants.
Policies Ind Prognmmes Afflcting
Productivi 8811 of Farming Households
It would give no justice to consider all farmer's
problams to have originated only in Panchayat rUle. In fact, the
governments of pre-19S0 Nepal, by assigning land'to a handful
of elites - - such as the priests, royal family men~ers, nobles,
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officials. tax collectors. etc. - - had forced the mass 'Of
cultivators to work as their tenants (Regmi 1971· 1976· 1978)
Thi' • , .
s tenant mal0rlty was not secure of its tenure nor was there
a standard rate about the rent. Tenants could be evicted in
favour of higher bids (HMG 1955: 38); land rents could be
appropriated in cash or in kind at any seasons (Regml 1971;
80-8.1); tax collection was made under contractual arrangements
providing contractors a right to charge any amount they could
c~lIect from the peasants. (Regmi 1976: 80-81); tenants were
forced to pay unpaid labour to the government. its officials and
local headman (Regmi 1971: Chap. vi). land concentration was
a probl.em also in state land in the lack of its ceiling. These
COnditions had forced many cultivators to bond themselves to
money lenders' usury for raising money to meet their needs and
obligations. (Regmi 1971: 98-100). Alternatively, they had
started to mIgrate towards India since the beginning of 19th
century. Also the government endorsed this labor movement
allowing the British to recruit the Gorkha force since 1885
(Rathaur 1987: 67).
In this chain of peasants' miseries had been able the
1951 revolution to raise public support for terminating the Rana
rule· The multi party governments of the post- revolution decade
had introduced therefore. some reform measures (e. g.. land
reform. programmes) aiming at improving their agrarian
conditions. But the political. instability of this decade with
hequ~nt changes of governments did not help towards
slgn,flcant progre.. for their implementation. Except converting
taX free lands of individuals to taxable form, no other changes
appeared from those measures· At the mean time. the king in
1960. dissolved parliamentary rule banning the operation of
political parties throughout the nation. Some of his charges
for taking thIS action were the lack of economic discipline
and "directionle:;sness" in . planning based on crude economic
theories" devoid of concern of people's problem in the multi-
party system 01 government (Devkota 1980: 645-46). Resuming
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absolute power under his controL the king introduced therelore.
the partyless Panchayat system to operate for the next 29 years
(before the 1990's revolutifln).
Also this system had introduced policies and
programmes addressed to affect productive base of farming
households. Those related to land reform. resettlement,
institutional credit and marketing were some of the important.
By principle. land reform and resettlement programmes had
their avowed objectives for improving farmers' access to land
and their labour relations; irrigation development and forest
management programmes were to facilitate their access to
water and forest products. Similarly. institutional credit and
marketing were supposed to improve falmers' technology by
providing them means and materials All these programmes had
a direct bearing on input-related compol,ents of a farming
system. They might also have indirect effect on the s~stem's
output and production activities through a change in cropping.
In this discussion. policies and activities related to
irrigation have been deliberately excluded. Such an exclusion
is not to lessen the importance of irrigation. But since only
13 percent of the cultivated land of the country is affected by
government-operated programmes (NPC 1985: 442), and they are
site-specific in their design. irrigation projects affect people
only of certain localities They. therefore, need no further
analysis in terms Qf equity of distribution. Moreover. other
irrigation facilities. wherever they are available, are based on
former-managed systems where government assistance is
limited to the issuance of credit on co.lsrruction materials.
This conversation leads accordingly wilh the description of the
characteristics of remaining programmes.
Land Reform
The immediate gain of the Panchayat rule was the
abolition of unpaid labour obligation by a law in 1963 (HMG




,rogramme again with the followlRg provisions (Zaman 1913:
Part I).
I. Redistribution of Land Above the Required Ceiling. The
Lands Act 1964, fixed a ceiling on agricultural landholdings
for both the owner and tenant families on a regional basis.
The size for an owner family in the Terai (plain land
bordering to India). hills and Kathmandu Valley was not to
exceed 18.4,4.9 and 3. I hectares respectively, while that
for a tenant family was 2.7, 1.0 and 0.5 hectares,
respectively. Any land above the ceiling was to be resumed
for redistribution to landless families.
Security of Tenancy Right and Fixation of Rent Rate.
Peasants cultivating lands belonging to others were
considered tenants and were protected by law to have
their tenancy right secured and inheritable. Rent was fixed
to a maximum of 50 percent of the main crop.
Interception 01 Debt and Compulsory Saving Scheme.
Agricultural loans to the farmers during the time of its
enforcement were to be assessed in terms of an interest rate
or other Obligations of the fermers and were to be stopped
by the governmant. Tenants and landowners were to make
inkind saving on compulsory basis from the main crops
grown on the land owned or cultivated, in order to raise
funds for agricultural projects. Such savings were to be
refunded at an annual interest of 5 percent after five
years.
Abolition of Jimidar system of tax collection. By this
provision land tax was to be collected directly by the
government agencies rather than by local tax collecting
functionaries.
~Islllllmint
Resettlement programfT,e had its objective to improve
Productive base of landless households by providing them land.
Started witn the introduction of Rapti Valley Development
IU~
project in 1956 and accentuated by Malaria Eradication in the
Terai (1958), Panchayat government further established
Riselliement Company (1964) and Reselliement Department
(19~8) as formal bodies to arrange resettlements in wider
national scale Besides these, a number of ad hoc resettlement
committee and commissions - - such as Zonal Commission, the
One Man Commission, the Jhora Commission, the Tikapur
Development Committee, the High Powered Forest Conservation
Committees and Committees of Conservators and Exservicemen
had been established over years to resolve reseltlement
problems in particular areas (K. C. 1986).
Forest Management
Forest management policies refer to the extent to which
farmers use forest products for productive purposes (e g,
livestock raising. cultivation, etc). Until 1957 there were no
specific government policies on forest management activities.
People used it according to their needs without any local
restriction except in certain areas which wele under the control
of communities (Furer- Haimendort 1964: 105-112), In 1957, via a
Private Forest Nationalization Act. the government claimed
ownership over all forest areas except orchards and small plots
of planted trees All officials efforts until mid :970$ were geared
towards this type of forest use and protection.
After the mid-1970s, the nationalization of forest
resource in the lack of effective administrative machine tor
its control were believed to spur people to consume forest
products without bearing any responsibili'y fDr its protection.
It was thus, deemed necessary in 19/6 to place some forest
under community control for their approp';ate use and protection
(NNFP 1979: I~). Accordingly, since 197d, community fDrestry
became Dne Df Nepal's majDr forest m,nagement programmes
(Manandhar 1982)- Dne believed to encDurage peDple for its
management for fulfilling their needs of daily life such as
timber, fuel wood, leaves and grasses. Under this programme,
communities were to be entrusted with three ca:egories of
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lorest land - - Panchayat Forest, "anchayat Protected Foresl,
leasehold Forest - - for their maintenance, protection and use.
The first category was to constitute a degraded forest area in
which a Panchayat (local level political and administrative unit)
would have to reforests, protect and enentuelly claim the right
to use its products. The second category, on the other, was
to constitute forest land which a community would have to
protect in exchange of 3/4 of its income. Under the third
category, an individual or an institution could lease a degraded
forest from the government to reforest and use the products.
Institullonol Credit and Marketing
The chances 01 improving the economic standing of
farming households through improved agricultural productivity
was to depend also upon their investment potential and
opportunity to buy inputs and sell their produce. To achieve
this, farmers needed access to an effective source of agricultura I
credit and markets. Since 1960, some policies also had addressed
to this problem.
The establishment of a Co-operative Development Bank
(COB) in 1963 was the beginning of an institutional credit
arrangement for agriculture in Nepal. In 1966, the land RefOrm
Saving Corp)ration (lRSC) was established to channel savings
as envisioned in the Comuplsory Saving Scheme of the 1974
lends Act. In 1967. COB was converted to the Agricultural
Development Bank/Nepal (AOB/N) to broaden the access to
credit among farmers outside cooperative societies. Since 1975,
the LRSC marged "to provide short- medium 'and long-term
loans for aJricultural development to individuals, cooperatives,
village committees", as well as to groups of small farmers and
"to provide loans to tenants to buy land which they had been
cultivating" (Poudyal 1983: 11). There were 200 central, zonal.
branch, sub -branch and depot. offices throughout the country
to disbruse the loan until 1989 (NRB: 24).
In 1974, procurement and diffusion of agricultural inputs
such as seeQs, fertilizers and implements became the task of
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the Agricultural Input Corporation (AIC)- -a task previously
done by the Agricultural Supply Corporation. Since then, AIC
has been opereting its programmes through district offices,
cooperative societies and dealer merchants in different parts
of the country (Yadav and Rawa11981: 130); Singh and Shrestha
1981: 93). fhe cooperative socielies were also supposed to
arrange the marketing of agricultural produce and the purchase
and sale of goods for daily needs (Agrawal (1984: 18).
Policy utlctS of other Fectore Affocting
Farmers' Noods end ObligetiDns
As there were exeplicit policies and programmes
addressed to affect productive base of farming households (i. e.,
the condition of farmers' access to resource and their activities
and oiJportunities), there were related policies towards
population change, social service (e. g. education, health)
development and market network expansion, Which also affect
farmers' needs and obligations. This section discusses the
possible effects of these related policies on farmers' needs
and obligations.
PDpuletion Chongl
The population of Nepal has increased rapidly in the
past few decades. The 5.6 million population recorded in the
first censuS of 191 heached above 15 millions in 1981. This rate
of growth, especially since 19jOs, hlS been phenomenal. The
decades of 1910s and 1920s observed a negative growth; the
following decades, however, showed a steadily increasing
positive growth rates: 1.1 in the 1930s, 2.2 in the 1940s, 1.6 in
the 1950s 2.1 in the 1960s, and 2.6 in the 1970s (CBS 1987: 7).
The negative growth of the 1910s and 1920s is
interpreted in terms of lack of measures to control mortality and
under-repOlting/enumeration of existing population during
census operations. The slow but positive rate of growth for the
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1930s was thus interpreied as 11 result of under enumeration of
~revious population census. S«nilarll', that of 1940s is
Interpreted as a result of repatriation of Nepalis engaged in
World War " and improvements in the methods of 1952/54
census operation (Kensakar 1980: 12-14).
Repatriation was a case also for the 19505. Other than
t~is are, however, some other explanation fOr population growth
sInce the 1950s. One was a gradual decline of mortality rate.
The crude death rate for the early 1950s was estimated to be
36.7: it has decreased to 11.9 in the mid-1980s (compiled in CBS
1987: 2'.8). This decline can be altributed to the improvements
of medical facilities during this period. Together with Malaria
Eradication Programme, there was also the spread of other
immunization facilities, using OPT, BCG and cholera
vaccinations. Attempts were also made to increase the number
of hospitals, health posts and medical centres through a series
of development plans (NPC 1985: 781-82).
But mortality decline do not constitute the sale
explainat ion of population growth in Nepal. In 1958, at the same
year the Malaria Eradication Programme started its operation,
the Nepal Family Planning Association began to provide binh
control service in cenain areas. Since the mid-1960s, the
dissemination of family p/a"ning services has become one of
the avowed "ational policies of periodic development plans.
Several agencies and institutions have also been affiliated with
the national programme (CBS 1987: 312-28). Despite these
efforts, however, growth rates steadily rise. Why is this so ?
One of several explanations may be the low level of
education of the COUntry's population. In 1987, the literacy rale
was estimated at 33 percent of the total population (CBS 1988:
6). No estimate was given, however. by sex. But if the 1981
figures can provide a guide, the literacy rate for females is only
1/3 the size for males (Cas 1986: 128). As most of the family
plannmg campaigns are addressed to femeles, this situation may
lOG
",suit in a iow understanding 01 contraceptive use. Similarly,
,migration can affect the absolute population size of the Terai
.nd urban areas which are the major destination of immigrants.
But the absolute decline in the immigrant population from
1971 to 1981 (CBS 1987: 155) suggest no ground to estimate
its contribution on overall growth rate unless it is empirically
verified. Cultural factors may also De explanatory. For example,
the cultural practice for prefering male childran to parform the
mortuary rites of parents in a Hindu society may prompt parents
to hava more children fOI tha sake of having males.
More important than the cultural factor however. is the
farmar's naed to hava more children for tha saka of income
for subsistence. The pre-1950s policies of exporting Napal's
unemployed labor force for incraased state revenue continued
aller this period. Consequently, the tempo of extra-agricultural
employmant generation within the country remained almost
stagnant; above 90 percent of population has always to depend
on agriculture. For this reason emigration remained an effeclive
source of income among rural households (Oahal. Rai and
Manzardo 1977: 65-69; OcOaugal 1968: 46, Caplan 1970: 1013-21;
Hitchock 1966: 17). Given the stagnation in the internal
employment structure, the incraased population through
mortality control has made emigration for subsistence an
attractive alternative. It involved 2.4 percant of the totai
population in 1952/i+ and increased to 3 5 percent in 1961 and
5.2 percent in 1961 (Rana and Thapa 1975: 45). This increasing
need to emigrate inevilab1y rEquired abla bodied male child,en,
thus promoting more births.
Saciol Service Cevelopment
(Haalth and Education)
The development of haalth facilities helped to decreasa
mortality and by contributing 10 population increase exerted
edded pressure on farmers' resources. More specifically, thase
health facilities required farming households to spare more
107
mOney io avail themselves 01 health services. fhe sam.
applies to education. The increase in the number of students
at all school levels rose from a total of 10.4H in 1950 (Stiller
and Yadav 1979: 225) to 2.434,188 in 1986 (CGS 1988. TaDles
92.3,4.8). Since 1975, students from grades I to 5 were freeel
from school fees and reading materials (CBS 1988: 142). If they
wanted to pursue their studies further. however, parents had
to bear these school expenditures.
Extension of Merket Network.
Until the middle of the 19th century, Nepalese villages
were virtually shut off from external market forces. This closure
was partly an offshoot of the problem of transportation in a
mountainous topography, and largely. the result of the rulers'
intolerance to the entry of foreign merchants (Naraharinath and
Acharya 1953: 18). Gradually "a growing taste of European
luxuries among Nepal's rulers opened the door" for Indian
traders, and since 1923, also for the import of goods from Japan
through India (Blaikie et al. 1980: Part I. Mihali 1965: II).
This exposure to external goods intensified after 1950s
with the opening of rural interiors through transportation
development. In 1951, Nepal only had a total of 376 kilometers
of motorable roads of any kind. This increased to 6,306
kilometers in 1986 (CBS 1988: 119). This increase might not
a;lpear significant in terms of its coverage. What is important is
that roads contributed to bring growing number of farmers near
the market places. It also added new items such as spices,
cigarettes. watches and the like in the farmers' homes (Caplan
1970: 91).
These types of increased expenditures of farming
household could be termed as development only if they have
been supported by 8 healthy growth in farmers' income through
an improvement in their productive resources and opportunities.
Let us explore. then, whether the policies and programmeS
affecting productive base of farming households have been able
to sustain those expenditures.
lOS
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These three policies and programmes- -land reform.
resettlement and forest management- -though different in
terms of the time and context of their origin. aHect the use
and distribution of land They complement each other so much
that a failure in one leads to 8 negative effect in the others.
For this reason their performance is analyzed together.
Available information suggests a gloomy picture of
land distribution resulting from the Lands .Act of 1964. During
1961/62,74.9 percent of the landholdings in Nepal had a si,e
smaller than I hectare and covered only a total of 24.0 percent
of all cultivated land Another 19.9 percent of the total holdings
had a size in between 1 to 4 hectares with their share of the
total cultivated land at 35.7 percent. The remaining 5 2 percent
of the total holdings covered 40.3 percent of the cultivated land
which Were above 4 hectares in size.
The Landa .Act of 1964 was supposed to improve this
level of disparity and concentration in landholding. But the
performance did not fulfill this expectalion. Nearly 77 perce~t
of the landholdings in 1971/72 and 66.6 percent of those 10
1981/82 had a size les's than 1 hectare. Altogether. their share
over the cultivated land was not more than 25.9 percent in
1971/72 and a lower 17.3 percent in 198t/82. In contrast, 4 5
percent of the total landhOldings in t971/72 and a larger S.4
percent of those in 1981/82 were above 5 hectares in size and
covered 34 8 percent and 36.4 percent of the cultivated land
during those respective periods (calculated from CBS 1986
Table 3.42).
This failure stemmed from both the programme
provisions and the process of their implementations. Given a
10?
situation where the average size of landholding per family was
0.54 hectares in the mountain, 0 74 hectare in the hill region and
less than 2 hectares in the Terai (DhitaI1975; 99), the act approved
a size of 18 heclares per owner-family in the Terai where lived
1/3 of the country's population (CBS 1987; 18) owning more
than 2/3 of all cultivated land. Every son over 16 years of age
and every unmarried daughter above 35 (effective from 1975)
could constitute its own separate family for this purpose. Where
there Was no system of vital registration, one coul~ imagine the
loopholes engendered by these operations.
With these inadequacies, the programme was
imPlemented on a phase-wise basis with much publicity and
propaganda. This "provided a good opportunity to the landlord
cless to dispose land, divide it among sons and relativas or
make false transfers and other arrangements for retaining
control over the land in access to the prescribed ceiling"
(Poudyal 1982: 30-31). Consequently, of the estimated 600,000
hectares of land made available for redistribution. only 66,380
hectares (or the II percent of the estimate) were classified
above the ceiling after the implementation of the programme. Of
those only about 34,000 hectares have been appropriated for
redistribution (K. C. 1986: 6),
With regard to land rent, Zaman's (1973) evaluation of
land reform revealed that even before the 1964 programme, most
of the farmers had not paid the rent for more than 50 percent of
the produce. The Act simply provided a legal sanction to this
rate to threaten the position of tenants in areas where they were
paying lesS than this amount. Moreover, security of tenancy
right is not obtained for two reasons. First the sanction for a
tenancy relation between an individual owner and his
cultivator is itself an endorsement of feudalism. Second, by
fixing the tenant's access to a maxim~m of only 2.7 hectares of
land to cultivate in exchange for half of its produce. the Act
created a large gap between tenant and owner cultivator with
the lalter to appropriate all produce from up to 18 hectares of
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land. In this case, certificates of lenutial security did nol serve
to improve the tenants' access to productive resources.
Indeed the resettlement programme could be viewed as
a measure devised to enable farmers to escape Irom
marginalization and landlessness As has been noted above,
emigration had already been a traditional source of subsistence
for farming households to meet their increased expenditure.
Despite this increasing trerd. emigration alone could not relieve
the total burden brought about by a degraded agrarian structure.
It was also unlikely that larger number of emigrants could be
ebsorbed in a foreign destination. There were already
indications that Nepalis were being expelled from Burma in the
1950s and later. from some parts of India as well (Pandey 1987a:
14). Given this condition, the Nepalese government felt it
earlier to allow landless or marginal peasants to .tay in the
virtually ownerless forests of the Terai. Until 198~. the
Resettlement Company and the Resettlement Department - - the
two major institutions handling resettlEment in Nepal - - had
relocated 49,819 families in 58.599 hectares of land (wallace
1981: 143) - - a process which continued until the end of the
Panchayat system,
But the downpour of hill people in search of land in
the Terai was to outweigh the number of people that
resettlement programmes could handle. According to a World
Bank estimate (1979: 21), an average of 7,000 families each year
between 1966 to I\>75 migrated to Terai for lan~. The regional
growth pattern of the population, with the Terai having an
annual growth of more than 4 percent in comparision to less
than 2 percent for the hill and mountain regions and the Terai
serving as destination of 78 percent of Nepal's internal migrants
during the 1970s (CBS 1987: 155) odd convincing support to
that estimate.
The incapacity of resettlement programme to absorb
peasants was reflected in the number "f families it had resettled
ar,d in the decrease in the land sizes that had been distributed
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to ieselliers over time. The Rapti Valley Development
Programme (1958) was too generous in allotting a size upto 33
hectares for each resellier family. This was brought down to a
reesonable size of 2.7 hectares under a 1964 company
programme. It was rendered to 2 hectares in 1974 and dwindled
to \ hectare in 1978 (Paudel \980: IS). During mid-1980s, there
Were also some places (based on the author"s observation
in Nawalparasi district) where resatllers were only given O.OJ
hectare of land.
The decrease in land size issued to resealer families
had casted a bleak light on the future of resattlement
programmes to provide peasants with sufticient land resources.
Moreover, there still existed the question of fairness in the
amount of land distributed under the programmes Some studies
(Ojha 1983: 34) have shown that some resettlement programmes
were influenced by individual political motives disregarding the
economic standing of resettled households. Other programmes -
- such as those in Nawalparasi district around the time of the
national referendum (i979) - - were instigated by the
government to mobilize the voles and meet the survival crisis of
the Panchayat Political System (Pandey 1984: Chap. ~). After
the problem was resolved, resettlers from such areas were again
evicted by official means to make their economic life constantly
unstable.
This lack of sincerity and fairness in land distribution
and the incapacity 01 the resettlement programmes to absorb
land hungry peasants lorced people to search for more resources.
Indeed Terai forest areas have already witnessed the growth of
unofficial settlements (Pandey 1987b) alld the Hills have
experienced constant clearing of marginal lands (Eckholm 1976;
77 -78) As a result, the size of cultivated land in the country
has increased through years - - such as from about 1.700
thousand hectares in 1964 to 3,127 thousand hectares in the next
sixteen years (compiled in Wallace 1987; 3). Together, the use
Qf forest for fuel wood, fodder and grazing -and for 10ggfRg by
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goveinment agencies or their contractors have contributed \0
decrease the forest size from 6.4 million hectares around 1963 to
about 43 million hectarers in 1978 (NPC 1985; 476), a docrease
01 over one-third the size in justover a decade. Community
approach towards forest management was a thin hope to
improve this situation.
As programme in itself, afforestation by the government
or its drive to urge local communities to regenerate, maintain
and use their resources was a humble measure. But like in other
programmes, the problem appeared to translate this ideology
into effective operation_ Reviewing the achievements of the
past two periodic plans (a ten years period) the seventh plan
had noted;
...... thought top priority was given in these two
plans, only 57,000 hectares could be covered by
afforestation. Thus, in two plans or in 10 years if
47,000 hectares have been afforested on the one
hand, on the other side the destruction of the
forest in one yeer is more than two times that of
afforestation in 10 years (NPC 1985: 477).
There was still another disincentive for community
forestry wherever it was planned to implement. Semply stated,
communities under Panchayat protected forest provisions could
not directly use the income from the forest under their
management Rather the income was to be forwarded to the
central government which was supposed to return the income in
the form of a grant. Whether communities retained their trust in
this financial arrangement is itself a question heitherto
unexplored.
b. Institutional Cr.dlt and Markoting
Despite the grim performance of policies and
programmes related to land use and distribution, an effective
performance of the institutional credit and marketing
prollrammes Qo~ld offer some hope to improve the farmers'
economic standing by helping, at least, to improve the
productivity of their meager resources under their control,
Unfortunately. the performance of these programmes remained
equally dismal.
With regard to institutional credit, the. CompulsorY
Saving Scheme of the 1964 Lands Act was able to raise an
equivalent of USdoliar 15 million within four years of its
implementation (Baskota and Lohani 1985: 101). Unfortunately
the administrative machinary assigned to dispense credit was
inelfecient in recording the collection and use of the savings.
As a result. the funds were used for the personal benefits of
those in charge of the scheme and led to the clos.ure of the
whole Programme in 1969 (Poudyal 1933: 36).
From then onward, the government's bank loan
programme appeared the only source of institutional credit for
agricultural activities. However, available evidences show that
the programme was inadequate in coverage and inequitable in
distribution to meet the credit needs of farming households.
According to an Asian Development Bank estimate, institutional
credit could cover only 24 per cent of the totel agricultural
credit in the country (adopted in ·Adhikari 1987: 14). In terms
of its distribution, the Nepal Rastra Bank's study in 1977
(adopted in Hamal. Bhattarai and Niraula 1987: 4) has shown
that of the total' credit given to different categories of farm
households - - 67 per cent for the large. 36 per cent for the
medium, 20 per cent for the small and a smaller 13 per cent for
the marginal form households - - was covered by institutional
Sources. Where above 70 per cent of farming households in the
country are small and marginal farm households (NPC 1983: 37)
above 80 per cent of their credit was granted by indigenous
sources. i. e. local money lenders.
This pattern of loan distribution is expected given the
provisions of the credit programmes. Under the programmes.
farmers needed to deposit a collateral against the loan they
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bOllowed. Such provisions Inevitably blocked the access of
tenant cultivators to the programme es they were not owners
Who could deposit land as collateral. Also the small and
marginal farmers only had limited sourcas in comparision to
enlarge farm households As expected. benefits went more to
latter than the former.
In like manner. the distribution of chemical fertilizei
favoured specific regions over time. During the 5th five-year
plan (1975-80), for example, the sale of fertili,er in the country
totaled 210.000 tons. Of this total 16 per cent went to the hills,
36 per cent went to the Kathmandu Vallfy and 48 per cent went
to the Terai (Singh and Shrestha 1081: 93). A slight change
appeared in this distribution pattern in the late 19&Os. For
instance, of the total 376 thousand metric tors of chemical
fertilizer distributed during t~e first 9 months of the fiscal year
1988/89.72 per cent went to the Terai. 9 per cent went to the
Kathmandu Valley and 19 per cent went to the mountain and
hill areas (HMG 1989: 31). This change in favour of the Terai
against Kathmandu Valley is justified since the Terai shares
about 2/3 of all cultivated land But the share given to mountain
and hill appaars negligible in comparision to its share of
population which is above 50 per cent of the total. Even in terms
of agricultural land. the less than 20 per cent share of the
chemical fertilizer allotted for mountain and hill areas was not
favourable in comparision to the Terai; and it is the Terai Where
the land reform programme had permitted large landholdings.
In turn. the marketing of agricultural products was
left coompletely to individual hands (Shivakoti and Pokharel
1989). Coperative societies theoretically supposed to handle
this business engaged, in practice, only on the supply of certain
input such as fertilizer and on the sale of consumption goods.
(Mishra and Satyal 1981: 87).
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Structural Roots of Programmes
Performances
The previous discussion shows three interconnected
features of the performance pallerns of pol icies and activities
affecting the productive base of farming households, under
Panchayat rule. These are.
I. The policies and programmes aimed towards
distributive equity among households with different levels of
access to agricultural resources were provisionally as well as
operationally biased in favour of hOuseholds with higher access
to resources (such as land). Thus, they had little redistributive
effect to improve tha resource base of peasant majority.
2. Consequently, programmes related to distribute
common resources in reserve (such as reselliement in the Teral
forest) were under heavy pressure to reduce the size of the
resource itself (1. e., forest land for the next generation)
without being able to improve the resource needs of the peasant
majority.
3. Seeing less and less prospects to improve farming
opporfunities under existing conditions, paasants were forced
to find axtra-Iocal means of support (emigration) for their
5ubsis!ence.
These features that wenf against the interest of farming
households prompt us to dwell on the nature of structural
arrangements for the formulation and implementation of those
programmes. Policy planning and implamentation can give due
recognition to the interest of farming households only at
conditions where they are represented in the formal bodies
discharging those duties. As national policies and programmas
they are decided by a national legislature and implemented by a
bureaucracy designed for that purpose suggest therefore, the
need of their representation in those structures.
Jl6
Popular representation (in this case tepre.entation 01
peasant majority) in the legislative body requires two basic
conditions. The first is a commilled leadership to an ideology
backed by the people who form the membership of that body.
The second is an opportunity for the people to exert pressure on
the body of membership through organizational means in case
this legal body violates its commitlments.
The first condition includes two components. One is a
pool of candidates for leadership or membership to the
legislative body; another is the election process to select that
memllership The formation of Panchayat legislature (Rastriya
Panchayat). as seen below, involved the second of these two
components but lacked the other ccanditions.
Before the third amendment of Panchayat constitution
(19&0) eleclion process was indirect. People had right only
to elect members of local Panchayat bodies (village/town
panchayats), where those of the national legislature were to
be filtered from among these members through different stages
of upward selection. There were also few nominees of the
King.
The third amendment of the constitution made the
election process rather direct, providing all adults the right to
elect members for this legislative body. Whether before or alter
the amendment, however, what is similar was the condition
which determined the character of candidates and/or elected
members.
By banning the operation of political parties and
interest groups with any ideological backing. panchayal system
eliminated the possibilities for both the emergence and selection
of an organized leadership to represent a group at any level of
decision' making organization. On the other hand. the system
bore and ideology of "class coordination" (HMG. 1987: Part 4),
theoretically allowing all nationals at any level of socio-
economic strata to play the political games equally as
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"independents" or "nonpolitical men of integrity" (Joshi and
Rose 1966: 406). Consequently the system neither committed
itself to the supposed beneficiaries of development poiicies/
activities nor allowed them to advance their interest through
organized means. Because of a lack of "nationally organized
platforms and clear· cut election manifesto promising the
removal of economic and social injustice on ideological
grounds" or a lack of direct commitment of existing organization
to the suffers of those socio economic injustices, "the
panchayat elections at all levels" involved merely an undisguised
play of selfish and personal interest" (Shah 1982: 100). This
personalism allowed those who had resources and connections
to manipulate the siluation.
Thus as the "representatives" did not represent the
people, they did not h,ve any commitment to perform for thorn.
They could not be expected to pass progressive policies to
improve the productive base of farming households - - i. e.
policies that would go against their own interesl. At this level
of policy formation. the bureaucracy had little to implement.
Moreover, whatever that was left to implement still faced two
struclural barriers.
The first related to the social background of
bureaucrates themselves. Since 1956, employment in Nepalese
. bureaucracy was theoretically open to all Nepalese of any social
and economic strata provided that they could meet the required
education quelifications (HMG 1983). But this theoretical
openness was difficult to apply in the concrete. For example,
where the literacy rate of the country was estimated at only
33 per cent (CBS 1988: 6), more than half of the government
civil service had drawn its members from Kathmandu Valley
which contained about 3 per cent of the population (Shah 1982:
98) and 37 per cent of the 1981 urban population (calculated
f~om CBS 1988: Tables 1.4 and 1.5). Similarly, as almost all the
h.gher level educational institutions were, as still are
concentrated in urban areas, the remaining half of civil servic~
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members should come mostly from urban areas outside the
valley' and from landowning village aristocrates who could
support their children's education outside their locality. A
bureaucracy drawn from this section of society would retain a
different interest from that of other sections. And as any
progressive policies would threaten this group's interest.
bureaucrates were hardlY inclined to implement such policies.
This is why, even after 26 years of implementation (from 1964
to 1990), the land reform programme, as observed above, had
not been able to appropriate more than half of that minimum
lind found above the legal ceiling. Even though, a son born 10
years after the 1964 Lands Act had been of age to retain his
own share of landholding, Panchayat's plans had mentioned
the need to implement land reform for aporopriate improvement
in landownership and utilization pattern (NPC 1985: 460), untill
the time of its demise.
The second barrier relates to the relative strength of
bureaucracy over the legislative body. That the bureaucracy
did not represent the mass of peasanls should not mean that
there should be no bureaucracy or it be composed of uneducated
majority. At this point, the availability of higher educational
facilities for peasant families would be an undeniable
recommendation for the long run. But the bureaucracy could
still be forced to implement the positive features of existing
policies if the legislative body could unite as an organized
voice against bureaucralic indifference. Unfortunately. as
observed above, the elected members of Nepalese legislature
lacked group liability and were completely unorganizEd to amass
the necessary group strength and thwart bureaucratic
indifference.
The.e structural barriers were reflected even in the
Decentralization Act of 1982 (HMG 1988). The premble of the
Act sought to enlist people's participation in the distribution of
development resources and in the share of its benefits by
encouraging them to frame and implement their development
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pians For this purpose. the Ward Committaes' of each viliage
and town panchayat were to prepare their wards pecific
development plans which were to be integrated in their
respective panchayat plans. Those village and town panchayat
plans were then to be sent to their respective district panchayat
upward, on the basis of which district development plans were
to be determined. They would come into effect after the
approval of the National Planning Commission - - the central
planning body of the country.
The plans and programmes so approved were to be
implemanted by district. town and village panchayats or their
wards based on the cOVerage of the programmes. Sucli
implementation would have to be made through the formation
of users' groups with the help of service centers established by
the gevernment. Issues under these plans and programmes
included education. health, population, technology and
marketing of agricultural activities as well as preservation and
use of forest resource.
Althought the Act was still to be implemented in full
vigour. there were some provisions to discourage optimism.
First amo 19 such provision was the right of central bureaucracy
to determine what was to ba incorporated in local development
plans (J\rticle 6) Seclnd the government had retained full right
to reduce or control any taxes. fees. and contracts imposed by
the Panchayats to raise their economic resource (Article 28).
Third. government's donations to local development programmes
would not always come in open 'grants; in many cases. the
government also would determine the sectors of expenditure
over which Panchayals would retain no right to change (Article
24), Fourth, given the structural context of determining the
• Wards Were the constituencies of vif/age and/or town p.nch.yat members.
E.ch ward h.d an executive committee of .fected members Ihe Chairm.n
of which would be Ihe exofficio member of the concerned viffege .nd/of
town pench.yat.
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iiabiiilY and commitment oi Panchayai membership (a§
discussed above). it was only the Panchayat body with a
government office at any level that could frame and implement
local plans and programmes. The users' groups at any level were
to be chaired only by any member of related Panchayat
organizations (Article 19).
In the attact on these structural arrangement geared to
favour the elites that to oppositional leaders had been able
to amass public support to bring down the system. At thia
moment deems important to identify some challanges for the
post revolutionary government(s).
Challanges for the Post-Revolutionary
Government(s)
Public support to the 1990's social change movement
can be observed into three basic components: (I) support to the
direct process of anti-Panchayat movement, (ii) voting against
to Panchayat elites in the subsequent parliamentary election,
and (iii) providing right to Nepali congress party to frame new
government with the United Marxist and leninist party in strong
opposilion A continuity of this type of support to these twa
parties is to depend. however, upon the degree of their
fulfillment to their promise with the mass of population.
As noted in their respective election manifestos, Nepali
Congress has its promise to eastablish political freedom and
economic equity through a process of what it calls "democratic
socialism", Similarly. the United Marxist and leninist party has
promised to pave a way towards communal control of the maans
of production for economic equi1y and for fraedom to people
from economic exploitation. A translation of either of these
promises into concrete reality is. however. to depend upon the
ways of their dealings with the following two structural
challenges:
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t. Challange in Policy Formation: After the demolition
of Panchayat rule, its elites were, though, oustee from formal
power structure are, however, working as opposition group also
in the system after the revolution- One of the challanges for the
new group of elites in the government to frame progressive
policies benefiting the masses will come. therefore, from the
opposition of this sections of society. The people supporting the
system-change movement ane helping to sweep away the
Panchayat elites in the process of election may be able to
support the governmenl'from this type of a challange. But'more
important is whether the new group of elites will feel them selves
be threatened of their interest from this type of policies will
determine the structure of future development and the level
of public support towards their activities,
\. Challange in the Implementation of Development
Policies: Despite a change in Political system, the bureaucrats
havs a fresh memory of their exercise of an absolute power
unopposed from the people. Under the changed environment
their activities will have to be guided and controlled by the
people through their representatives. In this circumstance there
are chances of the lack of bureaucratic cooperation towards the
implementation 01 new policies and programmes.
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